Wake up call on the Eastern front

ANITA SĘK

“It is not like it was with Poland or Hungary. There is no automatism when it comes to knowledge on transition. The history does not repeat itself” stated Gunnar Wiegand, EEAS Director for Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia, Regional Cooperation and OSCE , opening a debate On the Road to Reform: Assessing Progress in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The meeting was held on 5th October in Brussels on the occasion of a report’s presentation European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, prepared by experts of International Renaissance Foundation in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations.[1]

EaP on the verge

Assessing current authoritative developments in the region, Wiegand continued:  “the greatest challenge for the Eastern Neighbourhood is a misinterpretation of ‘the common values’, which stagnates the approximation between us and our Eastern partners”. ‘A deep and sustainable democracy’, ‘more for more’, ‘conditionality’ and ‘differentiation’ have been envisaged as the old-new principles guiding renewed in May Neighbourhood Policy. Richard Tibbels, Head of Eastern Partnership Division in the EEAS repeated an anecdote: “Russians make you an offer you can’t refuse; the EU makes an offer you can’t understand”, making clear that the integration speed mismatch is not only a fault of the Eastern Partnership countries.

According to Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Europe, EaP can be assessed only when main agreements envisaged by the initiative (Deep and Comprehensive FTA, Association Agreements) are finalised and implemented. Without them, although the EU’s policy towards the region allows the countries to network and share their experiences, it nevertheless remains vulnerable to behaviours of Belarusian type, e.g. rather imitating than implementing the reforms. “How much of a content bring 111 Ukrainian visits to Brussels this year? When the principle ‘less for less’ will finally be realised, why going beyond the Belarusian example then? What is the ‘plan B’ if the countries do not want to follow paths prepared for them? asks rightly Tapiola.

European Integration Index

The European Integration Index assessing annual progress or regress in the EaP countries’ integration with the EU, built upon questionnaires of Yes/No answers, filled out by national and international experts, was constructed upon three dimensions of cooperation:

1. Linkage in: political dialogue; trade and economic integration; sectorial coperation, people-to-people; assistance;
2. Approximation within: deep and sustainable democracy; market economy and DCFTA; sectorial approximation;
3. Management, e.g. institutional arrangements for European integration; legal mechanism; EU assistance; training; awareness about the EU; participation of civil society.

Country’s assessments

According to the Index, Ukraine is no longer recognised as the EaP frontrunner. The best performer is Moldova. ‘Mister >>Yes<< to any EU proposal’, as it is described, scores best in all three dimensions. Nonetheless, more work needs to be done in areas of anti-discrimination policy, combating corruption and organised crime. Moreover, Kishinev needs to face the fact that the popular consent on EU integration has been declining, as the nation has not seen so far any results of this painful unconditional Euro-love.

Georgia takes second place in the ranking. Nonetheless, rule of law, particularly judiciary, remains one of the most challenging issues for the country and the quality of public administration lags not only behind Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, but also Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a democratic test of peaceful post-election transfer of power has been passed and praised internationally. However, it is expected that a winning coalition of Georgian Dream will now be less interested in EU way, aiming at a better balance in relations with Russia.

Ukraine’s third position signifies drawbacks aiming at a better balance in relations with Russia towards Euro-integration, causing concerns in the areas of political and media freedoms, respect for human rights, the independence of the judiciary and the business environment. Brussels awaits signing the AA and DCFTA agreements for Kiev’s fulfilment of three conditions: resolving cases of selective justice, organising free elections of Verkhovna Rada (28th October) and reforming the state according to the AA commitments, e.g. within the judiciary system. Serious pre-election manipulations have already been reported by independent and opposition sources.

Remaining quite ambiguous towards the EU, Armenia has been simultaneously speeding up a dialogue with Brussels, unusually eagerly in the last year, gaining fourth position in the Index. Last political prisoners were released and society was given a freedom of assembly, and a partial freedom of expression, which nevertheless still lags behind the international standards.

Moreover, when it comes to EaP’s multilateral dimension, such a meeting as the one in May in Baku (EURONEST gathering with attendance of Armenian deputes) is nowadays hardly possible due to ‘Safarov case‘.

Though fifth in the ranking, Azerbaijan scores worse than Belarus in the section on freedom of elections, and is on a similarly low level regarding treatment of human rights activists. A post-Soviet mentality of the ruling elites and an oil-based economy of the country define structural impossibility of closer integration on the line Baku-Brussels. A frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh dominates the political relations. The EU is not a point of reference for Azerbaijan, which has recently gained internationally, winning a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, signing key agreements on the production and transportation of gas to the European markets, intensifying relations with NATO, joining G20 and chairing the GUAM.

Belarus closes the list in all three dimensions. It is believed that the EU has neither sticks nor carrots to encourage Minsk to cooperate. The European Dialogue on Modernisation with the Belarusian society, opened by Commissioner S. Füle in March 2012, after adopting a resolution imposing visa bans and asset freezes against Belarusian officials, meets several hurdles, and is treated by the ruling circles as a hostile Brussels-opposition initiative aiming at undermining Belarusian model of development.

The EU officials ask for more patience and advise to wait for results of undertaken initiatives. Still, in the most relevant for EU areas, such as democratisation and human rights, it is hard to notice any improvement. It’s high time for a wake up call.

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[1] Boris Navasardian (Armenia),Yerevan Press Club; Leila Alieva (Azerbaijan), Centre for National and International Studies (CNIS); Dzianis Melyantsou (Belarus), Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS); Vano Chkhikvadze (Georgia), Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF); Leonid Litra (Moldova), Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” (IDIS); Iryna Solonenko (Ukraine), European Integration Index.