NADINE MAZRAANI
The EU foreign policy in the Middle East has been largely influenced by the American leadership, but always kept its “European nuance”. In fact, it has less than strong support to Israeli approach towards the peace process and long condemned many of its practices. The decision to blacklist Hezbollah’s military wing follows a similar nuanced pattern. The debate has been going for sometime in the EU inner circles and corridors. However, the EU long resisted succumbing to American diplomacy and Israeli lobbying. The consent on blacklisting Hezbollah falls under the EU policy to keep its soil terrorist-free, following the terrorist attack in Burgas and compelling evidence of Hezbollah involvement in additional terrorist plot in Cyprus executed by a Hezbollah operative. Had it not been for the EU shuttle diplomacy that followed, this decision would have strengthened a questionable EU foreign policy actorness in the region.
Hezbollah’s military wing will join Hamas, Al Aqsa Foundation, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, al-Qaeda, and other listed terrorist organizations. Former Hezbollah leaders along with other few names will feature the amended list. EU blacklisting will encompass a freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic resources, as well as a ban on directly or indirectly making funds and other. However, Hezbollah’s embedded guerrilla mindset and military doctrine makes it rather uneasy to distinguish operatives, fighters or funders from civilian supporters.
“You can retake the visas you were granting to us. We do not have money in Europe. We do not have commercial or trade projects in Lebanon or abroad. Therefore, this decision has no effects in this regard”, said Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s General Secretary. Fifth of the Lebanese economy (estimated at around 8.2 billion USD per year) is supplied by remittances to family members in Lebanon. Troublesome is the task to track financial transactions from Shiites families in Germany* to family members in the southern suburbs of Beirut (known for Shiite concentration and for strong Hezbollah support) and investigate whether their purpose is a support for the military wing or tuition fees for the civilian supporters’ kin.
The flaw in the decision is that it draws a non-existent, mythical separation between the civilian wing and the military wing of Hezbollah. It is not understandable how the EU can differentiate between the political and the military wing, especially that Hezbollah has succeeded in transforming its military gains to political leverage. The strategy of talking to Hezbollah in order to contain might lead to false hopes regarding the ability of the EU to maintain this approach on the long-run. Politically, the separation between wings clearly legitimizes the group’s political cohabitation with the Lebanese institutions and government, falling short of domestic and international Western allies’ expectations. Furthermore, Nasrallah poked fun at this separation saying that Hezbollah’s ministers in the next government will be of the military wing of the party.
Hezbollah’s reaction follows the approach of painting in black a decision deemed a Zionist success to persuade Europeans to chime in. Hezbollah leaders and supporters celebrated Nasrallah’s statement in slamming the EU’s attempt to flex its foreign policy muscles by saying “dip it (the decision) in water and drink it.” Not surprisingly, Nasrallah has once again used the EU decision as a victimization card to increase zeal and mobilize supporters. In fact, Hezbollah’s advocates in the Gulf are already being ousted from the territory over Hezbollah involvement in Syria in a joint effort to curb the group’s financial transactions. Hezbollah’s most prominent figure is aware that the blacklist comes within a psychological warfare directed at the organization. However, he finds the EU entering a territory of its expertise promising that the decision will not go unnoticed.
Hezbollah considers this decision as an Israeli-American breakthrough in winning over the 28 member states. Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the Parliament known for his alliance with the 8th of March and affiliation with the Iranian-Syrian proxy, branded the decision as an attempt to compensate Israel for the EU decision to ban funding of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. “These countries make themselves a full partner in the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, on the resistance and on any target for the resistance in Lebanon”, said Nasrallah while praising the resistance movement and condemning member states’ decision. The General Secretary considers that Israel was given a pretext of waging a war against a “terrorist organization.” Ammar Moussawi, Hezbollah’s international relations official, wondered why the EU does not also blacklist Israeli Defence Forces on the same grounds of terrorist operations, citing the Mossad operation to assassinate the Hamas official, Mahmoud Al Mabhouh, in Dubai in 2010, using forged EU passports.
A decision to intimidate and paralyze terrorist activity has been followed by a policy of reassurance. In fact, the EU Ambassador to Lebanon Angelina Eichhorst rushed to contact Hezbollah leaders to explain the decision. She affirmed that Hezbollah is a recognized essential composite of the Lebanese fabric. Ambassador Eichhorst declared that “it (the EU) will also work with any cabinet that represents all parties and even if Hezbollah was part of it.” The incessant visits by Ambassador Eichhorst show an incapability of the EU to remain consistent and pursue its own policies.
Long overdue, the blacklisting does not create an international consensus aligned with Lebanese sentiments. Instead, Lebanon called on the EU to reconsider the blacklist’s implications on the Lebanese government facing a fragile stalemate. “We hope the EU reconsiders its decision out of its keenness not to take hasty decisions, to preserve Lebanon’s stability” said Michel Suleiman, President of the Lebanese Republic. The Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati has also expressed his rejection of blacklisting Hezbollah albeit having formerly entered a rift with Hezbollah and allies thus leading to his resignation in March 2013. Mikati pledged to work on reversing the decision. “We will follow up on the issue through the diplomatic means that preserve the best ties between Lebanon and Europe and the international community”, he said. Also, the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour, a strong advocate of Hezbollah, has refused to officially receive the EU decision.
Regarding Hezbollah opponents on the Lebanese scene, investing this decision in creating pressure on Hezbollah has already failed due to EU reassurance. Hezbollah’s military arsenal is a subject of vivid internal strife. The two camps, 8th and 14th of March, disagree over the Lebanese defence strategy and Hezbollah’s role in it and the state’s monopoly on the use of power. Thus, the separation fell below the 14th of March’s expectations which hoped to isolate any Hezbollah participation in the next government. In fact, the European ministers outlined that the blacklist does not “affect legitimate financial transfers to Lebanon and the delivery of assistance, including humanitarian assistance,” thus lessening the punitive effects and a potential political blame game.
With regard to Syria, Hezbollah is fighting a battle of survival along the Assad regime into what appears a long war of attrition. The blacklist serves as a mere political message stating the obvious that Hezbollah military operations in Syria are not acceptable to the European Community. Moreover, Europeans seek to show support after failing to agree on a collective rather than an individual decision to arm the Syrian opposition. However, sidelining the apocalyptic Hezbollah comes as a miscalculated move amid the Lebanese President’s efforts to revive the Dialogue Table assembling the various factions. It is rather dubious how the EU aims to encourage Hezbollah and engage it in the national dialogue in the aftermath. In addition, it remains to be seen if the decision will take a toll on the Hezbollah-UNIFIL relations on the southern borders.
In the past, not only Hezbollah provided for social welfare services and fought as a resistance movement against Israel, but also turned its fighters to reconstruction and relief workers after the 2006 war with high flexibility. This same flexibility plays in the Lebanese institutions and on the battlefield with only one wing using the resistance rhetoric. In return, the EU once again chose to be pragmatic, over normative. Consequently, it “aborted” the impact of a unanimous decision to blacklist what it considers a terrorist organization. Having refused before to shy from official normalization of relations with Hezbollah, the EU now chooses to keep a tacit normalization.
Ironically, while the EU differentiates between Hezbollah military and political wings, Hezbollah does not. “Everyone knows that Hezbollah’s political and military wings are one and the same”, stated Ammar Moussawi.
* Germany is known for being an attractive destination for Lebanese Shiite immigrants.
Nadine Mazraani – holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Notre Dame University in Lebanon (2010) and a Master of Arts in European Political and Administrative Studies from the College of Europe in Belgium (2012). Her thesis discussed the EU economic and political involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. She is currently Research Analyst at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) in Dubai. Her research interests include the EU foreign and security policy in the Middle East, European Neighborhood Policy (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), EU-Lebanese relations, Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli politics, religious and cultural minorities in the Middle East, defence procurements, foreign aid in international relations, and security and defence. As a member on the executive board of the Dialogue for Life and Reconciliation Organization (D.L.R.), a Lebanese NGO, she aims to promote interfaith dialogue in a region plagued by confessional strife.
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