KAROL BRONICKI, Asian Programme
An announcement of the “Dear Leader’s” passing away brought deep sorrow to the people of North Korea, and a question about future of current balance of power in East Asia to the world. For obvious reasons, Kim Jong-il’s death was no surprise neither for Korea, nor for the world. For this occasion different scenarios of events must have been prepared on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as among decision circles of the main regional superpowers. Many comments have suggested that in the event of Kim’s death the leadership circles might want to hide this fact and reveal it only after the question of succession has been solved. According to “The Guardian”, the last public sighting of the Dear Leader announced by Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea media happened on Thursday (he is said to have visited with his son a supermarket and a music centre). If we assume this is true, the announcement of Kim’s passing away has been revealed rapidly. This might suggest that the struggle for power has basically been resolved before Kim’s death, and is now smoothly following a previously set agenda. However, some sources in China suggest that the DPRK delegation to China (to honour the wax figure of Kim’s mother Kim Jong-suk) on December 16th might have been a cover up for an attempt to transport dying Kim to a clinic in China or his body from China back to DPRK. It is then possible that he had passed away even a week earlier than announced.
Nevertheless, the situation is being treated absolutely seriously by all key players and interested parties – South Korea, the USA and Japan having put their armed forces in the state of readiness. It is though not very likely that we will see any radical change of status quo in the near future. That is of course unless the affairs take a dramatic course, the latter being now difficult to predict. Kim’s son and successor Kim Jong-un, a graduate of a prestigious Swiss college, with perfect knowledge of English, German and French, might in a longer perspective attempt to gradually introduce economic reforms in order to silence the internal criticism of the system, which has proved incapable of meeting basic economic needs while exerting rigid control. The dramatic state of malnutrition and sanitary conditions of the North Korean people need an immediate government’s action, too. However, the military circles which are said to be significantly influential might be willing to turn the young and inexperienced new leader into a puppet protecting their own interests. Therefore, it is likely for small-scale demonstrations of power to happen in the future. In other words, we might yet see more incidents like the November 2010 shelling of South Korean Yeonpyeong island. They will not probably grow to a larger scale. DPRK leaders are aware that the end of the ceasefire would also be an end to the North Korean state as we know it today.
Considering the lack of transparency in DPRK’s internal affairs, it is much easier to predict the reaction of other parties. In fact, all are generally interested in preserving status quo: China, although severely disappointed with North Korean stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate within the six-party talks (between DPRK, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, the United States of America, Japan and Russian Federation, which were introduced in order to find a peaceful resolution to security problems concerning DPRK’s nuclear programme,), still sees DPRK as their main ally in the region. Even though re-unification with their Northern brethren might be a dream of every South Korean, in practice it is not likely to happen anytime soon. The difference in economic development by West and East Germany at the time of unification was 1 to 3, yet it drove the most dynamic economy of Europe into long period of stagnation. The difference in case of both Koreas is more than 1 to 20. Although an establishment of one Korean state is constantly declared as a main long-term goal, South Koreans are aware that it cannot take place in 1, 5 or even 10 years. The USA, experiencing their own socio-economic problems and occupied by geostrategic troubles in the Middle East, are also not likely to support any radical change in the region. Finally, a unified Korean state is definitely not what Japan would like to see. Therefore, all four countries will do everything to sustain stability in the region, perhaps taking the occasion to convince the new DPRK leadership back to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Despite the fact that not much is likely to change in shorter perspective, the new leader Kim Jong-un gives a hope for gradual reforms aimed at driving DPRK back into international community. Kim’s death might therefore be the first small step to peace and re-unification. Both Koreas are bounded together by history and tragedies of families torn apart. I am deeply convinced that despite all the obstacles they belong together. And together they will be, regardless if it takes decades or whole generations. May this be my Holiday’s wish to all my Korean friends, and the whole international community.
Official news about the death broke pretty quickly and this might mean that the succession to Kim Jong-Il was reasonably well prepared, just in time. I only wonder whether the majority of South Koreans really share such positive views towards a possibly reunification with the North.
Tank you for your comment. What i meant in this sentence was rather an abstract longing of the Korean people for a united Korean state, which i believe most Koreans share. That of course doesn’t mean they support the immediate unification, for the practical reasons that i mentioned in the text.
South Koreans have dramas, who would care about boring politics and the crisis if they can watch 소문난 칠공주 instead?
[…] K. Bronicki, The Kim is dead. Long live the Kim […]
[…] K. Bronicki, The Kim is dead. Long live the Kim […]