Jordan – waiting for democracy

ARTUR MALANTOWICZ, Asian Programme

Jordan, squeezed between Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with no serious natural resources, concerned with its water scarcity and sensitive socio-political environment and yet, one of the most stable countries in the Middle East. In fact, it is the only state in the Fertile Crescent where the same regime remains in power since the polity’s establishment in early 1920s. The regime’s survival has always been related to the strong support of the Arab Legion (later the Jordan Arab Army), the Jordan’s geopolitical centrality and extra-regional assistance aimed at securing the state from the threat of regional military intervention. It was also the effect of the rulers’ ability to address and adapt to evershifting internal and external conditions. Likewise, the Jordan’s experience with democracy had stability as its main goal. 

Unlike most of the countries in the Middle East, Jordan has a long tradition as the constitutional monarchy with a parliament in theory limiting the king’s executive power: the first parliament-like institution – the Legislative Council – was created already in 1928. Nevertheless, the political history of Jordan experienced only two episodes of democratisation, first of which took place in mid-1950s.

The 1952 constitution, at the time perceived as liberal, guaranteed various personal freedoms (e.g. freedom of opinion and the right to free association, political parties included), direct elections for the Chamber of Deputies, and system of checks and balances between the legislative and the royal court. The king’s position was relatively strong notwithstanding – he was entitled to appoint the Senate, to appoint and dismiss government officials, to dissolve the lower house of parliament and call for new elections. Soon after the constitution emerged, however, the regime started to restrict the public sphere, fearing of the increasing support for Arab nationalism. The ruling elite was also aware that political freedom worked against its interests, such as maintaining alliance with the United Kingdom or close ties with Israel. In 1957 the martial law was declared in response to the coup attempt and, after its ceasing in late 1958, it was subsequently reintroduced in effect of the June 1967 War and lasted until early 1990s.

The second wave of democratisation reached Jordan in 1989 when its economic situation severely deteriorated due to the structural decrease in oil prices worldwide, and, accordingly, a serious decline in private remittances by expatriate workers and official assistance from the Gulf states. Hence, facing budgetary deficits, weakening terms of trade and falling rates of growth, Jordan turned to international financial institutions to renegotiate its debt. In return for help, Jordan was forced to cut governmental expenditures and subsidies, to impose a new sale tax, improve and expand the tax base in addition to public administrative reform, financial deregulation, trade liberalisation and significant privatisation. All of the reforms sharply increased prices of fuel and food what, unsurprisingly, triggered anti-government riots across the kingdom. Confronted with the legitimacy crisis, King Hussein used the democracy agenda as a tool to re-establish the monarchy’s authority and bring back its stability.

In effect, the first full parliamentary elections in more than twenty years were held in November 1989. Consequently, the National Charter was drafted and endorsed by the king in June 1991, a month later the martial law was lifted and in 1992 the political parties were ultimately legalized. The following 20 years brought ups and downs in the democratisation process, depending on the international context of Jordanian politics, although the facade aspect of democracy – parliamentary elections – was maintained notwithstanding. Even though the electoral law in Jordan was commonly perceived as unrepresentative (it discriminated the mostly Palestinian-populated urban districts), it remained the basis of elections in 1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007. Furthermore, between November 1989 and December 2009 Jordan experienced 14 different governments, out of which only one survived longer than 2 years (under Prime Minister Ali Abu ar-Raghib, June 2000 – October 2003).

By the end of 2009 the level of dissatisfaction of the parliament’s work arose so high that King Abdullah decided to dissolve (not the first time in Jordanian history) the Chamber of Deputies; the new elections were to be held towards the end of 2010. A day later he instructed the government to amend the electoral law so that the new elections are “a model of transparency, fairness and integrity, and a promising step in our process of reform and modernisation, the aims of which are to achieve the best for our nation and to expand the horizon of progress and prosperity for Jordanians.” However, the new Elections Law of May 2010 contained only some of the popular demands: total number of the parliamentary seats increased from 110 to 120 with the women quota rising from six (introduced already in 2003) to twelve; extra four seats were granted to underrepresented urban areas of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa; the previous multi-seats districts were re-designed into 108 smaller single-seat sub-districts; strict punishments for votes-buying were introduced along the expansion of the role of the political observers to assure fairness and transparency.

Even though in the weeks leading up to the elections there were several incidents noted, mostly concerning arrests of the young people who were protesting against government and calling for an electoral boycott as well as instances of press censorship, the Election Day itself – November 9 – was an example of transparent, free and fair voting. It has also set a precedent in Jordanian history – for the first time the king invited international observers who joined national monitoring groups. Some of them indicated a paradox of the voting process being credible even if “the elections unfolded within a broader political system that lacks credibility”. Above all, the main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing), boycotted the elections. The official turnout reached 53% and among 120 elected deputies were thirteen women. King Abdullah called the parliamentary polls “an important step in Jordan’s democratic process in line with a vision of reform, development and partnership between the government and the legislature, which plays an essential constitutional role in the national development process.”

Then it came the Arab Spring. Already in 2003 King Abdullah himself predicted the events of uprisings in the region: “The leadership of the Middle East do not understand that 50 per cent of the population is under eighteen, and if they do not get going to create some means for real political participation for these young people, they are going to have serious problems” (The Washington Post, 21 September 2003). Luckily for the Hashemite monarchy, however, the popular protests in Jordan were a minor scale events (the biggest demonstration gathered no more than 8,000 – 10,000 people), especially in comparison with situation in Tunisia or Egypt. The manifesting left-wing supporters, sided with the Muslim Brotherhood, demanded the government dismissal, the political system reform and improvement in the socio-economic conditions in the country.

While trying to address the popular demands, the king dismissed the Samir Rifai’s government at the end of January 2011. Yet, not even two weeks later, the 36 traditional Bedouin leaders from the south of Jordan (commonly perceived as the monarchy’s backbone) sent to the royal court an open letter, in which they overtly criticized the king and his family. They mostly condemned Queen Rania’s political involvement (and corruption) which they perceived as going “against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing and [being] a danger to the nation and the structure of the state… and the institution of the throne”. Having no choice whatsoever, as such situation was without precedent, the king decided to hide Rania in the royal court’s shadows.

The continued protests convinced the regime of a need to undertake several political reforms. For this aim in mid-March 2011 the king established the National Dialogue Committee consisting of leaders of political parties, lawmakers, journalists and activists and assigned it with the task of reviewing the Elections Law and Political Parties Law to make the political system more democratic and more pluralistic. After the heavy clashes occurred in Amman on 24-25 March (with dozens of civilians and policemen injured) and again in mid-April, King Abdullah eventually ordered on 27 April the formation of a Royal Committee on Constitutional Review. The results of its work were published on 14 August and instantly became the framework of the discussions about strengthening the rule of law, ensuring balance between powers and wider public participation.

Throughout September the Committee’s recommendations were consequently discussed and endorsed by the parliament with only minor alterations. By the end of the month the amendments were signed by King Abdullah who called them a “turning point in the history of the Kingdom”. Indeed, the Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was amended for the first time since 1984 and, what is even more important, for the first time on such a large scale. The new provisions not only made any infringement on the rights and public freedom a crime punishable by law (Art. 7), officially forbade tortures (Art. 8), guaranteed freedom of scientific research and artistic activity (Art. 15), introduced independence of the judiciary (Art. 27) and the rule of “innocent until proven guilty” (Art. 101), but above all they established an independent commission to oversee the elections (Art. 67) and the Constitutional Court as an independent judicial body responsible for monitoring the constitutionality of laws and regulations (Art. 58-61), a novum in the Jordanian legal system. See the full list of the constitutional amendments.

It is nonetheless worth considering what has not been changed in the constitution. Even though the king’s prerogatives in case of force majeure were limited and he cannot indefinitely postpone elections any more (Art. 73), he still holds a serious power in his hands. He is immune from any liability and responsibility (Art. 30) and directly controls the government and the Senate members by appointing and dismissing them (Art. 35-36). He is also the Supreme Commander of the Army (Art. 32), an institution which constantly has a strong influence over public life in Jordan. Therefore there is a urgent need to undertake further comprehensive socio-political reform. Above all, the real multi-party political system should be introduced and the parliamentary elections should find its basis in the law reflecting the distribution of population. Furthermore, the monarch should give up its prerogative to nominate the prime minister and hence government should be formed through a parliament majority, a step King Abdullah already promised to undertake a couple of months ago. Only then one would be able to say that democracy in Jordan is not barely a façade of the autocratic monarchy but a real desire to open the Jordanian political scene.

While travelling across Jordan in September I found extremely interesting to follow the constitution amending process day by day as well as to see the “simple” Jordanians’ reactions towards it. What I have noticed is the fact that almost everybody shows support for the king in the reform process, although people expect King Abdullah not to be a master of rhetoric but a leader who is ready to undertake decisive measures so that the nation can see clear effects of the reforms. Is another government reshuffle an answer for these demands? Let’s hope it is at least a good beginning after the constitution’s refurbishment. Otherwise, the change may come from below…

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Artur Malantowicz – Director of CII Asian Programme (since July 2012), works at the University of Warsaw (UW) where he is also a PhD student at the Faculty of Journalism and Political Science. Graduated from the Institute of International Relations UW (2011) and the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies UW (2011) and in addition studied at the University of Kent in Canterbury (United Kingdom, 2008-09) and the University of Jordan (Jordan, 2012-13). Trainee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2011) and the EU Delegation in Amman (2013).
Research interests: International relations of the Middle East, regional security aspects in the Middle East (e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict, peace process, the Palestinian refugees), foreign policy of the Arab states, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (history, political system, foreign policy and the democratization process), superpowers’ policy towards the Middle East.

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