“The Great Popular Movement”

ANITA SĘK*

A question of honour? For ages of its history Poland did not possess a real professional army[1]. It was Polish (along with Lithuanian) noble class, gather spontaneously in significant times in a way of so called “popular movement” (pl. pospolite ruszenie), which was responsible for country’s protection and called upon by the monarch in the time of peril. What one can observe in today’s politics of Poland, being on-the-verge-of-its-first-Presidency-in-the-EU-Council, is presence of this unique feeling of the “popular movement”.

Staying on top of the EU’s management is regarded as very ambitious challenge not only by Polish government and (overloaded?) diplomatic service around the world, but also by Polish society, thrilled with enthusiasm about the forthcoming event. A challenge, often referred to as a question of honour.

An only technical meaning of Presidency? Driving a Presidency cannot mean dealing with national interests, but advocating priorities on the European level. Council Presidency after ‘Lisbon Treaty’ is then rather a technical task (see T. Pawłuszko’s art. “Nie taka prezydencja straszna” from April, 20). Its agenda is closely related to Union’s everyday’s’ activities – consequences of years-long policies. To finally overcome financial crisis and construct its new 2014-2020 financial perspective are contemporary EU’s goals. Therefore it is so essential not to overestimate the Polish leadership in the Union, particularly when referring to the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

A year of the Eastern Partnership? 2011 was supposed to be “the year of Eastern Partners”. Two Central-European Presidencies: of Hungary and Poland were challenged to give a new impetus to the programme. Nonetheless, after announcement by the Hungarians on 17^th February the postponing the 2^nd EaP Summit-just in order to fit into French plans to organize a G8/G20 summit at the same time-it appeared that Poland has been left alone with the initiative. Deep under the enthusiasm, coming from a privilege to organise a Summit, a dominant emotion must have been nothing else but disappointment. This would not be an issue provided that Warsaw possessed a potential to force a programme on the EU scene on its own, but Poland, even though it constitutes Union’s sixth biggest economy, still lacks political power and an ability to built coalition like in case of the EaP. Well, it already happens slowly with the Visegrad Group (PL-CZ-HU-SK) or the re-instituted Weimar Triangle (PL-DE-FR), but at the same time to the detriment of Poland’s relations with Lithuania, the next potential party to the programme. A state of play with biggest Polish non-EU neighbour, Russia, is not without significance either (see Table 1).

EaP – disappointments only? While seeking security and stability of its Easter border Poland titles Ukraine a ‘strategic partner’ and perceives Ukraine’s accession to the EU as a long-term priority. Therefore, disappointment with Orange Revolution’s withdrawal from democratic reforms has been regarded in Warsaw as a personal failure. Another disappointment came from Minsk. Closure of a new pragmatic chapter in Polish/EU-Belarusian dialogue after some oppositionists’ sentenceses happened as unpredictably as its opening just 1,5 year earlier on the 1^st EaP Summit in Prague. “The idea of the programme loses its attractiveness”, Belarusian MFA’s spokesman A. Savinych stated recently. As a result, Belarusian deputes were not invited to the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Euronest, but still “they are welcome”-under condition of free elections.

Can Poland channel the challenge? The most significant test for the EaP and Polish role in it will be the 2^nd EaP meeting on 29-30 September – and it is not a question “what” will be said or done there, but rather “who” will eventually show up. On the 1^st Summit the Union’s representation was rather weak. Is Poland able this time to attract more EU leaders?

Additionally, Warsaw prepares some other, not necessarily that much symbolic but perhaps even moreconcrete activities. It seems e.g. that Polish government has finally recognized the public role of social component and has noticed its actual functioning, in contrary to other EaP sectors (see Table 2).

Despite the high importance of the 3rd sector, Poland must act carefully, in order not to allow non-governmental actors to take control over the EaP and thus lead to degradation of the programme among member states. Despite the fact that CSOs involvement is crucial, it is inter-governmental level which particularly in the case of EaP has executive powers.

In other sectors, Warsaw would like to eventually sign, after more than three years of negotiations, the Association Agreement with Ukraine. Moldova is expected to start talks on free trade agreement. Also, having opened first initiatives, it is time for the first general review of the programme. The list of Polish initiatives (see Table 3) shows that Poland is truly willing to engage Eastern Partners on different levels.

Finally, one cannot forget that the EaP is an instrument to an end, not an end in itself. Long-term policy of comprehensive involvement and evolutionary integration is much more fruitful than political high-level occasional disputes. Warm-welcomed proposals of ”Group of friends of the EaP” and ”Business Council” still remain to be implemented. Poland does not have to prove its involvement into dialogue with Eastern Partners (see Table 4). But there is still a place for improvement. Is there also a will?